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EYEWITNESS EXPERT TESTIMONY AND
JURY DECISIONMAKING
STEVEN D. PENROD* AND BRIAN L. CUTLERt
I
INTRODUCTION
In cases where the reliability of an eyewitness identification is in question,
psychologists are sometimes called as expert witnesses to educate jurors
about factors that may influence eyewitness accuracy. There is considerable
debate within both the legal and psychological communities about whether
this testimony should be admitted. Proponents and opponents of expert
testimony disagree over whether there is adequate scientific foundation for
such testimony, whether the evidence offered by the expert is beyond the ken
of the jury, and whether expert testimony is likely to improve or impair jury
decisionmaking. We report a series of studies that examine these three issues
empirically.
The first study reviews experiments on facial recognition performance.
The review identifies a number of factors that have substantial and reliable
effects on eyewitness performance.
In a second set of studies, mock jurors are shown different versions of a
realistic videotaped criminal trial in which the primary evidence is the
identification of the defendant by an eyewitness. Evidence concerning the
crime and the identification procedures is systematically varied through the
testimony of the eyewitness and the police officer in charge of the
investigation. These studies indicate that jurors' evaluations of identification
evidence are not influenced by factors that are known to affect identification
accuracy. Instead, jurors are influenced by the confidence of the eyewitness.
Unfortunately, a number of studies indicate that confidence is only weakly
related to the accuracy of the identifications.
In a third set of studies, the videotaped trials include expert psychological
testimony. In the first study, expert testimony improves the sensitivity of
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jurors to eyewitness evidence. When expert testimony is presented, jurors do
take witnessing and identification factors into consideration and rely less on
the confidence of the witness. The study also shows that expert psychological
testimony does not simply increase jurors' general skepticism about
eyewitness evidence. Other experiments examine the influence of different
forms of expert testimony and judicial instructions on jurors' judgments. A
court-appointed expert produces only skepticism. A defense-hired expert
produces some sensitization to witnessing and identification evidence, but no
skepticism. Opposing experts (defense- and prosecution-hired) produce the
largest effects on both sensitization and skepticism. Judges' instructions,
designed to aid the jury in evaluating eyewitness evidence, have no beneficial
effect on jury decisionmaking.
II
CAN EXPERT TESTIMONY IMPROVE JUROR DECISIONMAKING?
The focus of the research reported here is jurors' use of scientific
evidence. Because of rapid technological advances in virtually all branches of
scientific endeavor, courts are increasingly being offered scientific evidence
and expert testimony. Expert testimony is also increasingly accepted into
evidence.' In contrast to the restrictive approaches of the common law, the
Federal Rules of Evidence 2 and their state progeny hold a relatively liberal
view on the admissibility of expert testimony. Under Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules, a person "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education" may testify if such testimony will assist jurors in
evaluating a fact in issue.3 As part of the liberalized treatment of experts,
courts are now admitting empirically based evidence and testimony on such
varied issues as obscenity, 4  dangerousness, 5  post-traumatic stress
syndromes, 6 the effects of pretrial publicity on people's attitudes toward a
defendant, 7 and the reliability of eyewitness identification. 8 The research
treated in this article examines issues associated with expert psychological
testimony on eyewitness identification.
Psychologists and legal scholars have long been aware of the fallibility of
eyewitness memory. The earliest experimental research on eyewitness
memory can be traced back to A. Binet and J. M. Cattell at the turn of the
1. See, e.g., THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS (S.
Fienberg ed. 1989);J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed.
1990).
2. FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975).
3. Id.
4. Saliba v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
5. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
6. Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1989); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292
(1982).
7. Firestone v. Crown Center Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
8. Arizona v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
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century. 9 Among the early legal scholars, Borchard offered an impressive
collection of cases in which miscarriages of justice had been documented.' 0
Mistaken identification was the single most common cause of injustice in
Borchard's collection. I Wigmore recognized the potential for improving the
accuracy of identifications from lineup tests with the use of psychological
research and sophisticated videotape equipment.' 2 Half a century later, this
potential has yet to be fully realized.
The acceptance of expert psychological testimony on issues associated
with eyewitness memory is currently a topic of heated debate.' 3 The
appropriateness of expert psychological testimony has been addressed on
moral and legal grounds.' 4 A considerable portion of the debate centers
around three empirical questions: (1) What are the quality and external
validity of the memory research on which expert testimony is based?, (2) Is
psychological knowledge about eyewitness memory beyond the ken of the
jury?, and (3) What are the effects of expert psychological testimony on jury
decisionmaking? 15 These questions arise in both the psychological and legal
literature; to date, the empirical evidence addressing these questions is
inconclusive.
III
THE QUALITY OF THE RESEARCH ON WHICH EXPERT
TESTIMONY IS BASED
A. Critiques of Eyewitness Research
Some psychologists doubt that the existing body of research and theory on
human memory is sufficient to draw valid conclusions about eyewitness
9. Whipple, The Observer as Reporter: A Survey of the Psychology of Testimony, 6 PSYCHOLOGICAL
BULL. 153, 154, 170 n.8 (1909).
10. E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932).
11. Id. at xiii.
12. Wigmore, Evidence-Corroboration by Witness' Identification of an Accused on Arrest, 25 ILL. L. REV.
550, 551 (1931).
13. See Loftus & Schneider, "Behold with Strange Surprise". Judicial Reactions to Expert Testimony
Concerning Eyewitness Reliability, 56 UMKC L. REV. I (1987); McCloskey & Egeth, Eyewitness
Identification: What Can a Psychologist Tell a Jury? 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 550 (1983); see also 10 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1-181 (1986) (issue devoted entirely to psychological testimony).
14. Bermant, Two Conjectures about the Issue of Expert Testimony, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 97 (1986);
Bersoff, Psychologists and the Judicial System: Broader Perspectives, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1986);
Buckhout, Personal Values and Expert Testimony, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127 (1986); Goldman, Cognitive
Psychologists as Expert Witnesses: A Problem in Professional Ethics, 10 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 29 (1986);
Hastie, Notes on the Psychologist Expert Witness, 10 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 79 (1986); Lempert, Social Science
in Court: On "Eyewitness Experts" and Other Issues, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1986); Loftus,
Experimental Psychologist as Advocate or Impartial Educator, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 63 (1986); Loftus, Ten
Years in the Life of An Expert Witness, 10 LAW & HUM, BEHAV. 241 (1986); Woocher, Legal Principles
Governing Expert Testimony by Experimental Psychologists, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 47 (1986).
15. Konecni & Ebbesen, Courtroom Testimony by Psychologists on Eyewitness Identification Issues: Critical
Notes and Reflections, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 117, 121 (1986); McCloskey, Egeth & McKenna, The
Experimental Psychologist in Court: The Ethics of Expert Testimony, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. !, 6-7, 8-10
(1986); Wells, Expert Psychological Testimony: Empirical and Conceptual Analyses of Effects, 10 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 83 (1986); Yarmey, Ethical Responsibilities Governing the Statements Experimental Psychologists Make
in Expert Testimony, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 101, 107, 112 (1986).
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memory. 16 The primary issues raised by these psychologists are that the body
of scientific research examining eyewitness reliability is not sufficiently large
to provide a basis for scientific conclusions, 17 that there is disagreement about
memory processes and the consistency of the research findings, 18 and that the
research techniques and subject populations used do not justify
generalization of the findings to actual crime settings.' 9
Konecni and Ebbesen have argued vehemently that a failure to sample
situations and populations renders memory research inapplicable to the
actual eyewitness setting: "Almost all studies which form the basis for expert
testimony in this area are simulations. Virtually none of these simulations
have been validated in terms of the real-world situations, stimuli, and subject
samples .... ."20
On the other hand, many psychologists have argued that certain factors
predictably influence identification accuracy at the perception, encoding,
storage, and retrieval stages of memory,2' regardless of the circumstances
under which the identification is made. Of course the consistency of research
findings and the extent to which memory and eyewitness testimony research
generalizes to actual criminal cases are ultimately empirical questions.
B. Assessing the Research
One way to examine the consistency and coherence of the research
findings is to use existing research as a data base for further, secondary study.
Shapiro and Penrod, for example, conducted a quantitative review or "meta-
analysis" of facial recognition experiments. 22 They examined the reliability of
"questionable" findings such as the claimed impairment of performance in
cross-racial identifications as compared to same-race identifications and the
positive influence of context reinstatement 23 on face recognition.
They analyzed the results of 128 eyewitness identification and facial
recognition studies, involving 960 experimental conditions and 16,950
subjects. The study was designed to address two general questions: First,
what knowledge have psychologists accumulated on factors that reliably
influence facial identification performance? Second, what areas of facial
identification research would benefit from further research?
16. See Konecni & Ebbesen, supra note 15, at 121; McCloskey, Egeth & McKenna, supra note 15,
at 8-10; Pachella, Personal Values and the Value of Expert Testimony, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 145 (1986).
17. McCloskey, Egeth & McKenna, supra note 15, at 9.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Konecni & Ebbesen, supra note 15, at 121.
21. B. CLIFFORD & R. BULL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (1978); E. LoFruS,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); G. WELLS & E. LoFruS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES (1984) [hereinafter EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY]; A. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, The Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony. A
Psychological Perspective, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM (R. Bray & N. Kerr eds. 1982).
22. Shapiro & Penrod, Meta-Analysis of Facial Identification Studies, 100 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 139
(1986).
23. Context reinstatement refers to efforts to reinstate mentally the conditions under which
observations were originally made.
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Two analytic techniques were employed: The first was an "effect size"
analysis, which combined the effect sizes of eyewitness factors across studies
that manipulated a particular factor. An effect size (indexed by d) reflects the
magnitude of differences between two means (for example, the mean correct
identification rate for male witnesses versus the mean. correct identification
rate for female witnesses) using a standard measure that permits comparisons
across different variables. A d of zero would indicate that two means are
identical, while a d of .3 (or -. 3) would indicate a difference in means that, in
the context of this study, is quite noteworthy. The larger the value of d, the
larger the impact of a variable on identification accuracy.
In the effect size analysis, Shapiro and Penrod found that large numbers of
variables operating at the encoding and retrieval stages produced significant
and sometimes substantial effects on performance (see Table 1, which
summarizes the impact of factors on correct identification rates). The
variables included context reinstatement (efforts to reinstate in the witness'
mind the conditions under which observations were originally made),
transformations in the appearance of faces (such as disguises and changes in
pose), depth of processing strategies (the mnemonic strategies employed by
witnesses during the original viewing), target distinctiveness, exposure time,
cross-racial identification, and the length of the retention interval. Though
not reflected in Table 1, the analysis indicated that there was little
correspondence between a factor's impact on correct identifications and that
factor's impact on mis-identification rates.
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TABLE 1







Encoding Instructions (High vs. Low)
Context Reinstatement (Yes vs. No)
Target Distinctiveness (High vs. Low)
Sex of Target (Male vs. Female)
Transformation (None vs. Disguise)
Race of Target (White vs. Minority)
Retention Interval (Short vs. Long)
Same vs. Cross-Race Identification
Same vs. Cross-Sex Identification
Live/Video vs. Still at Recognition
Elaboration at Exposure Time
Pose at Study (3/4 vs. Front-Profile)
Subject Age (Young vs. Old)
Training (Yes vs. No)
Exposure Time at Study
Live or Videotape vs. Still at Study
Grand Means for Knowledge of Recognition
Task








































< .05 ** < .001 *** < .0001
Numbers of subjects for hit rates are often smaller
missing data.
than numbers for effect sizes (d) due to
The second evaluative technique was a "study characteristics" analysis in
which the characteristics of all experimental cells in all of the studies were
coded, and study results integrated, to examine the influence of study charac-
teristics on performance. Study characteristics include the techniques, set-
tings, and experimental conditions under which the studies were performed.
This analysis permitted Shapiro and Penrod to assess the effect of viewing and
identification circumstances on witness/subject performance when examined
across previous studies. Some of the study characteristics examined (for
example, exposure time and retention interval) also served as independent
variables in many studies. The analyses of study characteristics are potentially
more informative than the effect size analyses, since the former contain more
than 950 correct identifications (based on judgments from more than 16,500
subjects),. while the latter have fewer than thirty correct identifications (even
though they are often based on between one and two thousand subjects). For
variables that appear in both sets of analyses, each analysis can be considered
a validity check for the other.
A problem of multicollinearity arose-that is, some study characteristics
proved redundant because they varied together across the studies. This
HI LO
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occurred largely because laboratory researchers made use of one set of proce-
dures while field researchers characteristically made use of somewhat different
procedures. For example, laboratory researchers frequently made use of
greater numbers of faces for subjects to remember, exposed faces to subjects
for shorter periods of times, and tested memory after shorter delay periods.
To clarify the analyses and results, correlated variables were combined into
groups for analysis and variables that were independent of one another were
analyzed separately. Among the variables and groups considered in the anal-
yses were: attention, which encompassed the degree that attention was focused
on the targets, whether subjects had knowledge of the recognition task, and
the mode of presentation at study; load at study, which included the number of
targets at study, the number of faces at study, and the total exposure time at
study; and load at recognition, which included the number of decoys, the
number of total faces at recognition and the ratio of targets to decoys. Vari-
ables that were largely independent of one another and independent of the
three main groups included pose, target sex, target race, number of seconds
of exposure per target, retention interval, number of faces presented simulta-
neously at recognition, and laboratory (versus eyewitness) facial recognition
studies.
In brief, Shapiro and Penrod found that when groups of variables and indi-
vidual variables were considered alone, each of them accounted for a statisti-
cally significant portion of variance in eyewitness performance, with a group
of "attention" and "study type" (laboratory versus field experiment) variables
accounting for the largest shares. Even when Shapiro and Penrod conducted
extremely conservative analyses in which the effects of all other variables were
"partialled" (statistically controlled for), most variables and groups of vari-
ables still explained statistically significant independent portions of variance
in performance. In all, the eleven sets of variables accounted for a highly
significant (and, arguably, forensically significant) 47 percent of the variance
in correct identification rates. This means that nearly half the variability in
identification performance could be explained by the variables included in the
analyses.
C. Summary
It was especially noteworthy that, after controlling for the effects of other
variables, "study type" accounted for only 3 percent of the variance in
performance. In contrast, when considered separately, study type accounted
for 35 percent of the variance. This result demonstrates that the
laboratory/field distinction is almost entirely redundant with the variables
that predict identification performance, and laboratory/field differences in
performance are largely accounted for by variations in attention, knowledge,
mode of presentation, exposure time, number of targets, and target race. In
other words, the argument that laboratory simulation results may not
generalize to performance under actual conditions is substantially weakened
by these and parallel results from the analyses of mistaken identifications.
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Laboratory versus field experiment differences in levels of performance are
largely accounted for by the different methodologies used in the two settings,
which attempt to reflect the natural variations in witnessing and identification
conditions that exist in real-world eyewitness situations. Laboratory, field,
and real eyewitness situations all vary along dimensions such as attention,
load at study and recognition, opportunity to view, same- versus cross-race
identifications, and so on. Therefore, knowledge about the effects of these
variations on eyewitness performance should, in principle, be of value to all
those (police, district attorneys, judges, jurors, and psychologists) trying to
evaluate the reliability of an identification made under a particular set of
circumstances.
IV
LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING EXPERT TESTIMONY
That mistaken identifications occur is not necessarily troublesome, at least
insofar as the identification procedures are fair. After all, the witness does not
convict an innocent suspect; guilt or innocence is the province of judge or
jury. Nevertheless, because mistaken identifications do occur, the criminal
justice system requires the use of corroborative evidence and provides for
rigorous cross-examination in order to minimize the probability that a
mistaken identification will result in a conviction. From a psychological
perspective, however, serious questions can be raised as to the effectiveness of
these safeguards.
A. Traditional Safeguards
The Supreme Court has recognized limitations on the admissibility of
eyewitness identification evidence when counsel is absent from the
identification proceeding,24 when identification procedures are overly
suggestive,2 5 and when other evidence surrounding the identification makes
the accuracy of the identification unreliable.2 6 While these safeguards are
helpful, they may not be adequate to prevent miscarriages of justice
associated with mistaken identifications. Consider "other evidence" bearing
on the reliability of an identification. The criteria identified by the Supreme
Court in Neil v. Biggers27 as indicators of identification accuracy are only
24. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (post-indictment identification of accused in
lineup inadmissible because accused's attorney was not present); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967) (criminal defendant has right to counsel at post-indictment lineup proceeding).
25. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967) (unnecessarily suggestive identification
procedure is a recognized ground for due process attack) (citing Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th
Cir. 1966)).
26. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (eyewitness identification may be inadmissible if
the totality of circumstances casts doubt on the reliability of the identification); Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188 (1972).
27. 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972). The factors were: the opportunity to view the criminal
during the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description, the
witness' level of certainty in the identification, and the interval between the crime and the
identification.
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partially consistent with the empirical literature. The Court correctly pointed
out that factors such as exposure time and retention interval should be taken
into consideration when evaluating the accuracy of identifications. 28 But the
Court also pointed to factors such as the accuracy of a witness' prior
description of a perpetrator and the level of confidence demonstrated by the
witness in the accuracy of the identification. 29 Later psychological literature
raises serious doubts about the correctness of the Supreme Court's
assumption that predictive validity is related to the accuracy of the witness'
prior description of a perpetrator and to the confidence the witness has in the
accuracy of the identification. 30
It is sometimes argued that cross-examination of the eyewitness also
serves as an important safeguard against mistaken identifications. 3 1 The duty
of the attorney is to make the jury aware of the factors associated with the
crime that call the accuracy of the identification into question. If, during the
cross-examination, the attorney establishes that the witness, having just left a
well lit room, viewed a perpetrator running down a dark corridor, it is then up
to the jury to draw the appropriate inference as to the likelihood that the
identification of the perpetrator was accurate. But is it reasonable to expect
that the jury is competent, without expert testimony, to give appropriate
consideration to factors such as dark adaptation and brief exposure time when
evaluating the identification? One author suggests that jurors are unlikely to
draw these inferences. 32 Furthermore, this same author contends that even if
the attorney were allowed to point to counterintuitive research findings
during cross-examination, the jury would probably dismiss the suggestions as
conjectural.33  Though the author doubts the effectiveness of cross-
examination in this regard, whether or not the jury will reach a
counterintuitive conclusion on the basis of the attorney's cross-examination is
best treated as an empirical question.
As an aid to jury decisionmaking, at least one court has gravitated toward
the use ofjudicial instructions.3 4 Judicial instructions concerning eyewitness
testimony should arguably have the effect of reducing reliance on cross-
examination and should allow the information contained in the instructions to
supplement what can be developed in examination of witnesses. In United
States v. Telfaire,3 5 the District of Columbia Circuit endorsed the use of a
cautionary eyewitness instruction in cases where the reliability of the
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer Anything about Their Relationship?,
4 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 243 (1980); Wells & Murray, What Can Psychology Say about the Neil v. Biggers
Criteria for Judging Eyewitness Accuracy?, 68J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 347, 350-51, 354 (1983); Wells &
Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, supra note 21, at 155, 169.
31. See, e.g., Robertson v. McCloskey, 676 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D.D.C. 1988).
32. Comment, Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1402,
1404-05 (1985).
33. Id. at 1404.
34. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
35. Id.
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identification is at issue. 36 This instruction directs the attention of the jury to
specific factors associated with the crime that might influence the accuracy of
an identification, including whether the witness had an adequate opportunity
to view the perpetrator, whether the witness ever failed to identify the
defendant, and whether the witness was certain about the identification. 37
Although the Telfaire instruction appears to be a step in the appropriate
direction, there are, once again, reasons to believe that the specific instruction
will be only minimally effective. First, the instruction points only to certain
factors without explaining the relative impact those factors have on memory
or identification accuracy. Second, some of the factors to which the Telfaire
instruction alludes are of questionable relevance. For example, the Telfaire
instruction points to the importance of the "strength of the identification," or
the confidence of the eyewitness in the accuracy of the identification. 38
Unfortunately, psychological research demonstrates that the confidence of the
witness is not strongly associated with the accuracy of the identification. 39
If one agrees that judicial instructions concerning the reliability of an
eyewitness identification should be predicated on empirical findings and
theoretical models, then one can plausibly argue that such commentary
should be given by those most familiar with the research. Thus, expert
testimony by. psychologists might be more effective than judicial instructions
in focusing the jury's attention on those factors most likely to affect the
accuracy of an eyewitness identification.
It is critical to note that expert psychological testimony about eyewitness
memory is quite different from expert clinical or psychiatric testimony. In the
latter, the expert is commonly called upon to give an opinion about the
mental state or the credibility of a witness. In the former, the eyewitness
expert gives no such opinion. Instead, the eyewitness expert discusses basic
memorial processes (for example, the perception, encoding, storage, and
retrieval stages of memory, and the constructive nature of memory) and the
types of experiments that are conducted on memory (for example, the staged
incident paradigm). In addition, the expert typically discusses factors specific
to the case that might have influenced the witness' memory (for example,
cross-racial identifications or the effects of stress). In this respect, the
testimony of the eyewitness expert is more analogous to a cautionary judicial
instruction than it is to expert clinical or psychiatric testimony. 40
B. Developments in the Case Law
Although the grounds for admitting expert psychological testimony on
eyewitness issues seem straightforward, the final decision as to its
36. Id. at 556.
37. Id. at 558.
38. Id.
39. Deffenbacher, supra note 30, at 244-46.
40. Monahan & Walker, Social Science Research in Law: A New Paradigm, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 465,
467, 469-70 (1988).
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admissibility has been left to the discretion of the trial judge.4 1 Until recently,
judges in most cases have excluded this type of expert testimony, reasoning
that such testimony would usurp the jury's role in assessing the credibility of
the eyewitness, and that such information is already within the ken of the
jury.4 2
In the first decision of its kind, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled in State v.
Chapple43 that a trial judge abused his discretion in excluding expert
psychological testimony on the reliability of an eyewitness identification. The
expert in Chapple was prepared to discuss the effects on memory of
unconscious transference and post-event information, the weak relationship
between confidence and accuracy, and several other related factors. 44 Unlike
other courts, 45 the Chapple court, in overturning the defendant's conviction,
was unwilling to assume that the jury was aware of such factors and could
properly apply them in evaluating the accuracy of an eyewitness
identification. 46
The Chapple decision preceded by several months the decision in People v.
McDonald, 47 which even more forcefully argued for the admissibility of expert
psychological testimony on eyewitness memory. In McDonald, the California
Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge had abused his discretion in
excluding expert psychological testimony on memory, and stated:
When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the
prosecution's case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it
independent reliability, and the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on specific
psychological factors shown by the record that could have affected the accuracy of the
identification but are not likely to be fully known to or understood by the jury, it will
ordinarily be error to exclude that testimony. 4 8
The McDonald court observed:
The expert testimony in question does not seek to take over the jury's task ofjudging
credibility: as explained above, it does not tell the jury that any particular witness is or
is not truthful or accurate in his identification of the defendant .... Thejurors retain
both the power and the duty to judge the credibility and weight of all testimony in the
case, as they are told by a standard instruction. 4 9
Chapple and McDonald were the first in a series of cases that have taken a
favorable view of the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness
41. See Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 453 N.E.2d 1204 (1983), and cases cited
therein.
42. United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048
(10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); People v. Johnson, 38 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 112 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1974); Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 208 S.E.2d 850 (1974); State v.
Ammons, 208 Neb. 812, 305 N.W.2d 812 (1981).
43. 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
44. Id. at 293-94, 660 P.2d at 1220-21.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973) (the court of appeals
implicitly assumed that jurors were capable of properly assessing the accuracy of an eyewitness
identification without benefit of expert testimony).
46. Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 294, 660 P.2d at 1221.
47. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
48. Id. at 377, 690 P.2d at 727, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
49. Id. at 370-71, 690 P.2d at 722, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
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memory. 50 Yet neither court established adequate criteria for other courts to
use in deciding whether to allow this type of expert testimony.
V
JUROR SENSITIVITY TO EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE
A. Dimensions and Importance of Juror Sensitivity
A central tenet underlying the developing legal position on expert
psychological testimony is that jurors are not fully aware of scientific
knowledge about memory processes. It is assumed that jurors are not fully
sensitive to the factors that influence eyewitness memory. Sensitivity, in this
context, may refer to: (1) the knowledge of how a factor influences memory
and (2) the ability to integrate or use that knowledge when making an
inference or judgment about eyewitness accuracy. Ifjurors are not adequately
sensitive to factors that influence the accuracy of eyewitness identifications,
they cannot effectively evaluate eyewitness evidence. Such insensitivity raises
doubts about the effectiveness of traditional safeguards designed to protect
defendants from mistaken identifications.
B. Prior Research
Do lay people effectively use identification evidence to draw appropriate
inferences about the accuracy of identifications? A few studies have addressed
this question. These studies generally use one of three methodologies: 5' a
multiple-choice questionnaire in which lay people are queried about factors
that influence eyewitness memory, 52 a prediction method in which the
witnessing conditions of an eyewitness experiment are described to the
subject and the subject predicts the identification accuracy rates, 53 and a
mock-jury method in which jurors try a case involving eyewitness evidence. 54
While each methodology has its advantages and disadvantages, studies
employing these designs have generally concluded that their empirical
findings are often inconsistent with lay knowledge of, and assumptions about,
factors that influence eyewitness identification accuracy-particularly with
respect to eyewitness confidence. These findings have led Wells to
50. United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 868 (1984); State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795 (1986).
51. For a critical review of these methods, see Wells, How Adequate Is Human Intuition forJudging
Eyewitness Testimony?, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, supra note 21, at 256.
52. See Deffenbacher & Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness
Behavior?, 6 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 15, 18, 26-29 (1982); Yarmey &Jones, Accuracy of Memory of Male and
Female Eyewitnesses to a Criminal Assault and Rape, 21 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC'Y 89, 90 (1983).
53. Brigham & Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Identifications, 7 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 22-24 (1983).
54. See Lindsay, Wells & Rumpel, Can People Detect Eyewitness-Identification Accuracy Within and
Across Situations?, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 79, 82-83 (1981); Wells, Ferguson & Lindsay, The
Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence and Its Implications for Triers of Fact, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 688,
690-91 (1981).
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recommend that "the lay person, as trier of fact, be counseled on these
matters."
55
Although previous research is consistent in showing that lay knowledge is
often at odds with experimental findings, the implications of these findings
are unclear. First, there is reason to believe that some of the previous
research may have overestimated lay knowledge of the factors that influence
eyewitness memory. Questionnaire studies, for example, provide
respondents with multiple-choice items-items chosen by the investigator
because of their supposed pertinence to eyewitness memory. Thus, the mere
presence of an item on a test (for example, an item about cross-race versus
same-race recognition) might sensitize the respondent to the importance of
the factor. It is not clear whether pertinent witnessing or identification factors
would be as salient in a criminal trial as they are in the surveys. The problem
is one of external validity, that is, the extent to which laboratory findings
apply to the real world. 56 It is also questionable whether the cognitive
processes associated with demonstrating one's knowledge through responses
to a psychological survey generalizes to drawing inferences about criminal
behavior from evidence presented at trial. For these reasons, we place more
emphasis on mock-jury studies than on questionnaire studies.
The prediction method can also be validly criticized because it is
questionable whether a description of an experiment captures the essential
elements of the actual experiment. If it does not, there is little reason to
expect that subjects will accurately estimate eyewitness performance in the
experiment.
Previous mock-jury studies might also overestimate the impact of
witnessing and identification factors on jurors' inferences. The underlying
basis for this claim is that previous mock-jury studies rarely manipulated more
than one or two variables in the body of trial evidence. The manipulated
factors, therefore, can theoretically account for a very large portion of the
variability in jurors' decisions. This contention is exemplified by Wells,
Lindsay, and Ferguson's finding 57 that witness confidence accounted for fully
50 percent of the variability in jurors' belief in the witness testimony. That is,
jurors' beliefs about witness accuracy were substantially determined by the
confidence expressed by the witness. In an actual trial, the jurors' decisions
are multiply determined, and the number of determinants of a decision (for
example, jurors' inferences) is, logically, inversely related to the predictive
value of any one factor.
In summary, previous research indicates that lay persons' notions about
witnessing factors, such as witness confidence, are inconsistent with the
55. Wells, supra note 51, at 272.
56. See, e.g., Berkowitz & Donnerstein, External Validity Is More Than Skin Deep: Some Answers to
Criticisms of Laborator. Experiments, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 245 (1982); Ebbesen & Konecni, On the
External Validity of Decision-Making Research: What Do We Know about Decisions in the Real World?, in
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN CHOICE AND DECISION BEHAVIOR 21 (T. Wallsten ed. 1980).
57. Wells, Lindsay & Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification,
64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 440 (1979).
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findings reported in the literature. Even though previous research yields
consistent findings, there are sound reasons to believe that the extent of the
impact of eyewitnessing factors on jurors' inferences can be better estimated
by simultaneously examining the effects of multiple witnessing factors, and by
more closely approximating actual criminal cases, that is, by increasing the
external validity of the experiment. The need for such an approach is
succinctly stated by Woocher: "Attempts should be made, wherever possible,
to simulate real-life conditions in psychological research . . . so that the
expert's testimony based on these experiments cannot be criticized as too far
removed from reality to bear any relevance to the court proceedings. '" 58
C. Assessing Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Evidence
In a series of studies, 59 we have investigated jurors' use of eyewitness
evidence. These experiments examined the lay person's knowledge about
and critical consideration of the variables that influence eyewitness memory,
and the lay person's belief in or skepticism about the accuracy of eyewitness
memory.
1. The Jurors and the Trial. Subjects in the first two studies viewed a
videotaped trial of a defendant accused of the armed robbery of a liquor
store.60 Subjects in the first study were 321 undergraduates who received
course credit for participation as mock jurors. The second study employed
the same design, but the subjects were 129 jury-eligible and experienced
jurors. Each juror was paid ten dollars for participating in the experiment.
Subjects watched the videotaped trial and completed a thirty-three item
questionnaire containing the primary dependent measures and the
manipulation checks. The videotaped trial lasted approximately forty-five
minutes. The format of the trial followed that of an actual trial. It began with
the prosecution's opening statement and was followed by the defense's
opening statement, examination and cross-examination of the four witnesses,
the prosecution's closing argument, and the defense's closing argument. The
videotape concluded with standard instructions from the judge. During their
closing arguments, both attorneys reiterated and emphasized all the
conditions surrounding the crime and the identification procedures
manipulated in the experiment. To maximize the realism of the videotaped
trial, practicing trial attorneys assumed the roles of attorneys.
58. Woocher, supra note 14, at 60.
59. Cutler, Dexter & Penrod, Expert Testimony and Jury Decision Making. An Empirical Analysis, 7
BEHAV. SCi. & LAW 215 (1989); Cutler, Penrod & Dexter, The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist, and the
Jury, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 311 (1989); Cutler, Penrod & Dexter, Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness
Identification Evidence, 14 LAW & HUM. BE-AV. 185 (1990); Cutler, Penrod & Dexter, Non-Adversarial
Methods for Improving Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Evidence (in press, J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY);
Cutler, Penrod & Stuve,Juror Decisionmaking in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 41
(1988); Cutler, Penrod & Dexter, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: The Hired Gun,
the Friend of the Court, the Battling Experts, and the Judge (unpublished paper under review).
60. See supra citations at note 59 and accompanying text.
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The primary source of evidence in the trial was the positive identification
of the defendant by the robbery victim. In all, four witnesses (the first two for
the prosecution and the second two for the defense) were examined and
cross-examined. The first witness was the liquor store clerk who was the
victim of the robbery. She testified about the witnessing conditions at the
time of the robbery, and the conditions under which she identified the
defendant as the robber. The second witness was the police officer in charge
of the investigation. He also testified about the conditions under which the
identification was made. The third witness was a friend of the defendant who
served as a character witness and offered a relatively weak alibi for the
defendant. The fourth witness was the defendant. He denied all allegations
against him, but offered little concrete evidence in support of his innocence.
2. Independent Variables. Approximately twenty witnessing and identification
factors were discussed in the trial, all of which surfaced in the examination
and cross-examination of the first two witnesses. Ten of these variables were
systematically manipulated in a complex design that yielded sixty-four
factually different versions of the trial.6 1 Each factor was presented in one of
two forms. The ten factors were:
1. Disguise. In half of the videotapes, the witness testified that
the robber wore a knit cap fully covering his hair during the robbery.
In the other half of the videotapes, the witness testified that the
robber wore no hat.
2. Weapon presence. The. witness testified either that the robber
outwardly brandished a handgun and pointed it at her throughout
the robbery or that the weapon was concealed. This manipulation
was designed to test for a "weapon focus" effect. 62
3. Violence. In 50 percent of the cases, the witness testified that
the robber verbally threatened to kill her, manhandled her, fired his
handgun into the floor, and pushed her to the floor before leaving; in
the remaining cases, the witness testified that the robber calmly and
quietly demanded the money, and left after the clerk complied with
the robber's demands.
4. Retention interval The witness testified that the identification
was made either two or fourteen days after the robbery.
5. Mugshot search. The witness testified that during the interval
between the robbery and the identification, she either searched or
did not search through mugshot books for the robber.
6. Lineup instructions. In all of the videotapes, the police officer
repeated verbatim the instructions given to the witness before the
61. See Kenny, Quantitative Methods for Social Psychology, in I THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 487, 490 (G. Lindzev & E. Aronson eds. 1985).
62. See Cutler, Penrod & Martens, The Reliability of Evewitness Identifications: The Role of System and
Estimator Variables, II LAW & Hum. BEHAV'. 233, 240 (1987); Loftus, Silence Is Vot Golden, 38 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIs'r 564, 568, 569 (1983).
Page 43: Autumn 19891
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
witness made a decision on the lineup test. In half of the videotapes,
the police officer instructed her to "choose the suspect from the
lineup whom you believe is the robber or indicate that the robber is
not in the lineup." In the other half, the police officer instructed her
to "choose the suspect from the lineup whom you believe is the
robber," without explicitly offering her the option of rejecting the
lineup.
7. Lineup size. The witness testified that there were either six or
twelve persons in the lineup from which the defendant was
identified.
8. Similarity of lineup members. This manipulation refers to the
fairness of the lineup. 6 3 In half of the trials, the witness testified that
there were several lineup members who resembled the robber in
physical appearance. The police officer also testified that, in
choosing foils to appear in the lineup, he provided another officer
(not involved with the case) with the witness' original description of
the robber and asked him to choose foils for the lineup who matched
that description. In the other half of the videotapes, the witness
testified that there were few lineup members who resembled the
robber in physical appearance and the officer testified that, in
choosing foils for the lineup, he recruited anyone who was available
at the time.
9. Voice samples. The witness testified either that she was
allowed to hear the lineup members speak before making a decision
or that she did not hear the lineup members speak.
10. Witness confidence. The witness testified that she was either
80 percent or 100 percent confident that she had correctly identified
the robber.
Testimony was also given about additional factors, but these factors were
held constant across experimental conditions. For example, the witness
testified that she was able to view the robber for approximately 90 seconds
(the duration of the robbery), and that before seeing the lineup, she was about
80 percent confident that she could correctly identify the robber. In addition,
the witness testified that she was allowed to see a front, three-quarter, and full
profile view of each person in the lineup parade. The defendant testified that
he had no prior convictions.
The manipulated variables were chosen because of their forensic relevance
and because they have been shown to have reliable effects on identification
accuracy (although some of the variables show more reliable effects than
63. Doob & Kirshenbaum, Bias in Police Lineups-Partial Remembering, 1 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN.
287, 289 (1973); Lindsay & Wells, What Price Justice? Exploring the Relationship of Lineup Fairness to
Identification Accuracy, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 303 (1980); Malpass & Devine, Measuring the Fairness of
Eyewitness Identification Lineups, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE (S. Lloyd-Bostock & B. Clifford eds.
1983).
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others). 64 For example, a recent analysis of thirty-five tests of the eyewitness
confidence-accuracy relationship found the average correlation to be .25.65
Examining the witnessing and identification variables together with
witness confidence allowed us to verify an earlier finding that if the witness
was highly confident, jurors failed to take into consideration other witnessing
information (that is, exposure time and disguise of the robber) when inferring
the accuracy of the identification. 66 However, if the witness was less
confident, jurors did take the witnessing conditions into consideration when
inferring the accuracy of the identification. In these studies, this effect would
emerge as statistical interactions between witnessing (or identification) factors
and witness confidence in the prediction ofjurors' inferences and judgments.
3. Dependent Variables. The two primary dependent variables measured in
the study were verdict (guilty or not guilty) and each subject's rating of the
probability that the identification was correct. Other dependent variables
included the strength of each side's case, the credibility of each of the four
witnesses, the fairness of the lineup procedures, the neutrality of the lineup
instructions, and how threatened and frightened the witness testified to
having been during the robbery. In addition, subjects rated the probability
that the average person could make a correct identification given the
circumstances described. A set of free recall questions tested subjects.
memories for the testimony and eyewitnessing conditions.
4. Results. Results indicated first that jurors remembered the evidence
quite well. In particular, recall of the witnessing conditions was generally over
90 percent accurate. However, despite the excellent recall, none of the
variations in eyewitnessing conditions had a significant effect on student
jurors' verdicts, on the accuracy of the eyewitness identification, or on the
other assessments (dependent variables) they were asked to make. Overall,
only witness confidence influenced verdicts-51 percent of the 450 jurors
convicted if the eyewitness was 100 percent confident and 37 percent
convicted when the witness was 80 percent confident. Estimates of the
probability that the identification was correct were 67 percent and 60 percent,
respectively.
64. See Brown, Deffenbacher & Sturgill, Memory for Faces and the Circumstances of Encounter, 62 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 311 (1977); Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, Sci. AM., Dec. 1974, at 23;
Buckhout, Alper, Chern, Silverberg & Slomovits, Determinants of Eyewitness Performance on a Lineup, 4
BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC'v 191 (1974); Buckhout, Figueroa & Hoff, Eyewitness Identification: Effects of
Suggestion and Bias in Identification from Photographs, 6 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC Soc'v 71 (1975); Cutler,
Penrod, O'Rourke & Martens, Unconfounding the Eflects of Contextual Cues on Eyewitness Identification
Accuracy, 1 SOCIAL BEHAV. 113, 114, 120, 126 (1986); Davies, Shepherd & Ellis, Effects ofInterpolated
Mugshot Exposure on Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 232 (1979);
Deffenbacher, The Influence ofArousal on Reliability of Testimony, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE, supra
note 63; Malpass & Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66
J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 482 (1981); Shapiro & Penrod, supra note 22.
65. Bothwell, Deffenbacher & Brigham, Correlation of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Optimality
Hypothesis Revisited, 72J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 691 (1987).
66. Lindsay, Wells & Rumpel, supra note 54, at 84.
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Notably, among experienced jurors, but not among the students, weapon
presence did have an appreciable effect on probability ratings and on verdicts,
with the former being statistically significant. This effect, though, was
contrary to empirical findings. These jurors were more likely to find the
identification correct (66 percent) and to convict (46 percent) when the
weapon was present than when the weapon was hidden (54 percent and 30
percent, respectively).
Another analysis addressed the "witness sensitivity" hypothesis. This
hypothesis is based on the notion that jurors may assume that the eyewitness
was influenced by and/or accounted for witnessing and identification factors
when assessing her confidence in the accuracy of the identification. If that
were the case, jurors might see no reason to weigh these factors
independently and instead might rely solely on the witness' assessment of
these factors. Do jurors assume that witness confidence is influenced by such
factors?
To investigate this question, the study analyzed subjects' estimates of the
probability that the "average person" could make a correct identification
under the same circumstances in which the eyewitness identification was
made. This question asks jurors to ignore the idiosyncratic verbal and
nonverbal confidence information attributable to the specific witness in the
videotape. If the "witness sensitivity" hypothesis is true, the high or low
confidence expressed by the witness should have no effect on jurors'
inferences about the probability that the average person could make a correct
identification given the circumstances. However, other witnessing factors
might affect jurors' inferences.
Witness confidence, as expected, had a statistically insignificant effect on
probability ratings. However, none of the other variables affected probability
ratings either! This finding indicates that subjects could disregard the specific
witness' confidence when drawing inferences about the average person's
ability to make a correct identification, but did not compensate by
differentially weighing the other witnessing and identification factors. The
hypothesis that jurors fail to weigh witnessing and identification factors and
instead assume that the witness has done so in establishing confidence level
was therefore not supported by the results.
An analysis of the combined student and juror data set was undertaken to
determine whether general belief levels in eyewitness identification or
sensitivity to eyewitness evidence varied across subject groups. The results
clearly demonstrated that the sample is insensitive to virtually all of the
eyewitness identification evidence. Other than witness confidence, no single
variable produced a substantial or statistically significant effect on judgments.
Furthermore, the two groups did not differ significantly in their overall
verdicts and evidence ratings.
Only two differences in the use of witnessing factors emerged: Jurors were
significantly more sensitive to the mugshot testimony than were the
undergraduates, and jurors placed significantly more weight on the weapon
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presence testimony than did the undergraduates. The effect of weapon
presence on the jurors' judgments does not reflect sensitivity, as the direction
is opposite to that reported in the eyewitness literature. Both
undergraduates and eligible jurors placed about the same (disproportionate)
weight on witness confidence. 67
D. Implications
Although these experiments represent a substantial step toward
establishing the greater applicability of laboratory results to real-world
situations, they still support the conclusion of previous, less externally valid
research. Of the ten factors that were manipulated, only witness confidence
had a statistically significant effect on verdicts and on the perceived
probability that the identification was correct. The finding that witness
confidence predicted verdict and probability ratings was expected, given
previous similar findings. 68 Thus, the present study strongly suggests that,
relative to the other eyewitnessing factors that had trivial effects on jurors'
inferences, jurors weigh witness confidence disproportionately.
The factors that have been shown to affect identification accuracy (disguise
of robber, weapon focus, violence of robbery, retention interval, exposure to
mugshots, biased lineup instructions, lineup size, and fairness of the lineup)
had negligible effects on probability ratings and on verdicts. It is crucial to
note that, in our manipulation checks, subjects demonstrated superior
memory for evidence about disguise, weapon visibility, retention interval,
exposure to mugshots, and lineup size. In addition, violence of the crime,
biased lineup instructions, and lineup fairness all had profound effects on the
inferential rating scales, as evidenced by the effect size index d.69 There is
little doubt that subjects attended to and understood this evidence during the
trial, but they did not use the information to draw inferences about the
accuracy of the identification, culpability of the defendant, strength of the
prosecution's and defense's case, or credibility of the witness. Thus, there
was no evidence to support the proposition that jurors take witnessing factors
into consideration if the witness is less confident, but do not if the witness is
highly confident.
During the closing arguments of the videotaped trials, the attorneys
emphasized the conditions surrounding the crime and, in particular, the
manipulated identification factors. For example, instead of pointing out that
there was only one witness to the crime and the other evidence was weak, the
defense attorney instructed the jury to consider (in the appropriate
circumstances) that the robber was disguised, that the witness was under
considerable stress during the crime, that the lineup instructions pressured
the witness to make an identification, and that the lineup was unfair. Thus,
the attorneys gave more attention to these factors than they might have
67. See supra citations at note 59 and accompanying text.
68. Lindsay, Wells & Rumpel, supra note 54; Wells, Lindsay & Ferguson, supra note 57, at 446.
69. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of effect size d.
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normally. This extra emphasis might be expected to sensitize the jurors to the
factors surrounding the identification. Apparently it did not.
These studies clearly indicate that jurors are insensitive to eyewitness
evidence and that, with few exceptions, undergraduates and eligible jurors are
equally insensitive. When evaluating the identification, both groups were
insensitive to the effects of disguise, weapon presence, retention interval,
suggestive lineup instructions, and procedures used for constructing and
carrying out the lineup; both groups gave disproportionate weight to the
confidence of the witness.
These results also speak to the real-world validity of mock-jury research.
As previously noted, several researchers have criticized the validity of
eyewitness research on the basis of its predominant use of the undergraduate
population. 70 The evidence from these studies indicates that eligible jurors
gave judgments similar to those of the undergraduates, thus supporting the
notion that research using undergraduates is, at least under some
circumstances, generalizable to the larger population of eligible jurors.
VI
PLAUSIBLE EFFECTS OF EXPERT'S INFLUENCE ON THE JURY
Commentators have offered a variety of hypotheses about the effects that
expert testimony on eyewitness issues may have on jurors. 7' These
hypotheses can generally be classified into three categories: juror sensitivity,
juror confusion, and juror skepticism.
A. Juror Sensitivity: Knowledge and Integration
Proponents of the use of expert psychological testimony on eyewitness
accuracy argue that such testimony would serve precisely the function
envisioned in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in that it "will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue
.. 72 In light of the earlier discussion of research showing that jurors
appear to be insensitive to probative evidence concerning the impact of
eyewitnessing factors on eyewitness performance, this hypothesis suggests
that expert testimony will sensitize jurors to the effects of various factors on
eyewitness performance and enable them to evaluate evidence more
effectively. Increased juror sensitivity to witnessing factors clearly would be a
desirable effect. 73
Note that sensitivity has two components: knowledge and integration.
Knowledge refers to simple awareness of how a factor influences eyewitness
memory, such as the direction and magnitude of the effect for a given factor.
Integration refers to the ability to render decisions that reflect knowledge.
70. E.g., Konecni & Ebbesen, supra note 15, at 123-24.
71. For a review of the available research, see Wells, supra note 51.
72. FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975).
73. McCloskey, Egeth & McKenna, supra note 15; Wells, supra note 51.
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For example, a judge of a pageant might specify in advance that candidates
shall be rated on the dimensions of physical beauty, personality, and
entertainment skills and that these three factors shall be given equal weight.
Though specified a priori, there is no guarantee that the judge's ratings will
actually reflect this weighting scheme. A perusal of a collection of data might
indicate that entertainment skills were given substantially less weight than
personality, which, in turn, was given less weight than physical beauty. If this
were so, the judge would show poor integration skills. If, on the other hand, a
collection ofjudgments indicated that the judge in fact used the rating scale in
accordance with the a priori rating scheme, the judge would show good
integration skills.
We have already seen that jurors are unaware of how some factors
influence eyewitness memory. But even if jurors were aware of the relative
effects of a given factor on eyewitness memory, the impact of that factor might
be attenuated due to jurors' poor integration or evaluation of the evidence.
In other words, the jurors' judgments might not reflect their a priori
knowledge. Decisionmaking research in a variety of psychological domains
shows that integration is quite difficult to achieve, even with trained judges.74
B. Juror Confusion
Critics of eyewitness expert testimony follow the analysis of Rule 403 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence and argue that expert testimony will either have
no effect on jurors and will therefore be a waste of time, or that the testimony
will simply confuse jurors and make it difficult for them to sort out and evaluate
the evidence. 75 Some psychologists have expressed similar reservations about
expert testimony, stating that "there is the possibility that the testimony will
affect the jury in some unanticipated and undesirable way. Jurors may
misinterpret, overgeneralize, or misapply the information presented by the
psychologist, and so may come to unwarranted conclusions." 7 6
Clearly, it is possible that expert testimony will have no effect on the
judgments of jurors. Though pessimistic, this hypothesis is reasonable in
light of research indicating that jurors have difficulty understanding and
applying legal concepts at many stages of the trial process. At the pretrial
stage, it has been amply documented that judicial admonitions to ignore
pretrial publicity when drawing inferences about a defendant are largely
74. See, e.g., Goldberg, Simple Models or Simple Processes? Some Research on Clinical Judgments, 23 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 483 (1968); Slovic, Analyzing the ExpertJudge: .4 Descriptive Study' of a Stockbroker's Decision
Processes, 53 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 255 (1969) (technique based on the analysis of variance
employed to describe stockbroker's evaluation of a security).
75. McCloskey, Egeth & McKenna, supra note 15, at 6.
76. ld.
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ineffective. 77 The procedures used to select juries can lead the jurors to draw
inferences about a defendant's guilt. 78
Jurors' understanding of various forms of trial evidence has been the focus
of considerable research. Thompson and Schumann 79 have shown that jurors
have difficulty evaluating mathematical and statistical evidence. Jurors also
are known to draw inappropriate inferences in trials in which multiple loosely
related charges against a defendant are joined. 0 The studies reported above
clearly document the difficulty that jurors have with eyewitness identification
evidence.
Instructions given to the jury at the conclusion of the trial typically contain
healthy doses of legal jargon and clearly pose a challenge to jurors'
interpretive skills. Jurors have been shown to have difficulty with the most
common types of pattern instructions 8' and standards of proof.8 2 In addition,
jurors have difficulty applying more specialized instructions such as those
involving confessions 83 and presumptions.8 4
In short, there is abundant evidence that jurors have difficulty
understanding some trial evidence and sometimes have difficulty conforming
their decisions to the instructions they receive. The research underscores the
plausibility of the assertion that expert testimony will have little effect on the
77. See, e.g., Kline &Jess, Prejudicial Publicity: Its Effect on Law School MockJuries, 43JOURNALISM Q.
113 (1966); Sue, Smith & Gilbert, Biasing Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Judicial Decisions, 2 J. CRIM. JUST.
163 (1974); Sue, Smith & Pedroza, Authoritarianism, Pretrial Publicity, and Awareness of Bias in Simulated
Jurors, 37 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 1299 (1975).
78. Haney, Examining Death Qualification, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 133 (1984); Haney, On the Selection
of CapitalJuries: The Biasing Effects of the Death Qualification Process, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984).
79. Thompson & Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's
Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 1I LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987).
80. Greene & Loftus, When Crimes AreJoined at Trial, 9 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 193 (1985); Horowitz,
Bordens & Feldman, A Comparison of Verdicts Obtained in Severed and Joined Criminal Trials, 10J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 444 (1980); Tanford & Penrod, Biases in Trials Involving Defendants Charged with
Multiple Offenses, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 453 (1982); Tanford & Penrod, Social Inference
Processes inJurorJudgments of Multiple-Offense Trials, 47J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 749 (1984);
Tanford, Penrod & Collins, Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence of Charge Similarity,
Evidence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 319 (1985).
81. Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable. A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury
Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979); Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors'Participation in Trials: A
Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 231 (1988); Heuer &
Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with Written and Preliminary Instructions, 13 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 409 (1989); Penrod & Cutler, Assessing the Competency ofJuries, in THE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC
PSYCHOLOGY (I. Weiner & A. Hess eds. 1987); Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to
Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 153 (1982); Penrod, Conducting
Experimental Research with Real Trials (Oct. 1984) (talk given at the Society for Experimental
Social Psychology, Salt Lake City).
82. Kagehiro & Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
159 (1985).
83. Kassin & Wrightsman, Confession Evidence, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL
PROCEDURE (S. Kassin & L. Wrightsman eds. 1985); Kassin & Wrightsman, Coerced Confessions, Judicial
Instruction, and MockJuror Verdicts, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 489 (1981); Kassin & Wrightsman,
Prior Confessions and Aock Juror Verdicts, 10J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 133 (1980).
84. Cutler, Penrod & Schmolesky, Presumption Instructions and Juror Decision Making, 1 FORENSIC
REP. 165 (1988).
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judgments of jurors . 5 While it might be hypothesized further that failure to
remember eyewitness evidence or expert testimony might cause this result,
the studies discussed earlier demonstrate that memory for eyewitness
evidence is quite good.
C. Juror Skepticism
Critics of eyewitness expert testimony also cite Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence to argue that expert testimony may be prejudicial because it
will simply induce skepticism about eyewitness testimony generally. 86
Specifically, these critics contend that the expert psychological testimony will
cause jurors to give insufficient and therefore inappropriate weight to actual
eyewitness testimony. Legal commentators such as Woocher have observed
that "an experimental psychologist's impressive credentials might lead the
jury to rely too heavily on her opinion and therefore undervalue the weight of
the eyewitness evidence. ' 87
While there is agreement that improved juror sensitivity is a desirable
effect of expert testimony, 8  there is considerable disagreement about
whether jurors should be made more skeptical of the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications.8 9 There is ample evidence that eyewitness identifications are
often inaccurate. Realistic field experiments show that witnesses give correct
judgments on identification tests approximately 50 percent of the time.90 But
there is less evidence about jurors' a priori beliefs regarding the accuracy of
identifications. Given these valid criticisms of the research, few conclusions
can be reached about the desirability of a ikepticism effect.
D. Research on Expert Psychological Testimony
It is theoretically possible to examine skepticism and sensitization effects
independently. It is possible to detect juror confusion as well. Unfortunately,
the procedures designed to test the effects of expert testimony in previous
research have confounded skepticism and sensitization effects and thus made
it quite difficult to determine exactly how jurors are affected by expert
testimony.
85. McCloskey & Egeth, supra note 13, at 558 ("[T]he available evidence fails to demonstrate
that expert psychological testimony will routinely improve jurors' ability to evaluate eyewitness
testimony. However, neither do the data rule out the possibility that expert testimony could have
beneficial effects."); see also McCloskey, Egeth & McKenna, supra note 15, at 6-7.
86. McCloskey, Egeth & McKenna, supra note 15, at 7.
87. Woocher, supra note 14, at 57.
88. McCloskey, Egeth & McKenna, supra note 15 (an overview of research and scholarly opinions
regarding expert psychological testimony); Wells, supra note 51 (discussing desirable versus
undesirable effects of expert testimony on jury decisionmaking).
89. Bermant, supra note 14; McCloskey, Egeth & McKenna, supra note 15. at 7.
90. Brigham, Maass, Snyder & Spaulding, Accuracv of Eveuitness Identifications in a Field Setting 42J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. Psyctioi.ocV 673 (1982); Krafka & Penrod, Reinstatement of Context in a Field
Experinment on Elvewitness Identification, 49J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PsYCHOLoGY 58, Fig. I (1985).
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Wells, Lindsay, and Tousignant 9 ' showed their subjects videotaped direct
examinations and cross-examinations of eyewitnesses (in total, videotapes of
108 different witnesses were used). Half of the subject-jurors also saw
videotaped expert testimony about eyewitness testimony. The expert's
testimony, which lasted for approximately 5.5 minutes, centered on levels of
accuracy of eyewitness identifications and on the weak relationship between
confidence and identification accuracy. Finally, the expert suggested that
jurors attend to the situational factors involved in the crime and not to the
confidence of the witness. Those subjects who heard expert testimony viewed
the videotape of the witness cross-examination after the videotape of the
expert testimony.
Based on an earlier experiment, 9 2 witnesses were classified into one of
three groups differing in identification accuracy rates: poor (33 percent
correct), moderate (50 percent correct), and good (74 percent correct). The
study found a main effect for expert testimony: Jurors who heard expert
testimony were less likely to believe the eyewitnesses than jurors who heard
no expert testimony. There was also a main effect for witnessing conditions
indicating that jurors were somewhat sensitive to them. Although there was a
trend toward improved sensitivity with expert testimony, the effect was not
statistically significant. Thus the study yielded a skepticism effect and a non-
significant sensitizing effect.
Loftus' 93 mock-jury study subjects read a criminal trial transcript. The
violence of the crime and the presence of expert psychological testimony were
independently manipulated. Loftus found that expert testimony significantly
reduced the number of convictions and that, in direct contradiction to the
eyewitness research findings discussed above, the violence of the crime
increased the number of convictions. 9 4  The trend toward increased
convictions associated with violent crime was weakened by the expert
testimony, though the effect was not tested for statistical significance. -' 5 These
findings suggest that the expert testimony produced some sensitization. A
second experiment revealed that juries exposed to expert testimony spent
significantly more time deliberating about the eyewitness evidence than did
juries that were not exposed to expert testimony.9 6
Hosch, Beck, and McIntyre9 7 exposed subjects to a videotaped trial and
manipulated the presence of expert testimony. Juries that heard the expert
testimony rated the identification as significantly less important to reaching a
verdict than did juries that did not hear expert testimony. Expert testimony
91. Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in
Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 275 (1980).
92. Lindsay, Wells & Rumpel, supra note 54.
93. Loftus, Impact of Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 65 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 9 (1980).
94. Id. at 12.
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id. at 13-14.
97. Hosch, Beck & McIntyre, Influence of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Accuiacy on Jury
Decisions, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287 (1980).
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also significantly increased the amount of time that jurors spent discussing the
eyewitness evidence.
Maass, Brigham, and West98 examined the impact of several forms of
expert testimony on jurors' perceptions of the defendant's guilt. Subjects
read one of two court cases describing similar crimes. In both cases, the
.eyewitness gave a description of the perpetrator to an officer, but in only one
case was the perpetrator identified from a lineup parade by the witness. Four
expert testimony conditions were formed by combining two factors. Expert
testimony relied either on interviews with the witness or on research findings.
In addition, the expert either offered an opinion on the probability that the
identification was correct and explanations for the probability (for example,
time delays, arousal, cross-racial identification), or offered the probability but
gave no explanation.
Expert testimony led to more lenient pre- and post-deliberation
judgments. 99 In addition, when the expert testimony was based primarily on
interviews, an opinion with an explanation had a greater impact on guilt
judgments than an opinion without explanation. 00 If the testimony was
research-based, then the presence or absence of an explanation had no
impact.' 0 l Results were similar for verdicts.' 0 2 Subjects who heard expert
testimony deliberated longer than subjects who heard no expert testimony. 10 3
An experiment by Katzev and Wishart 10 4 concerned judicial commentary
rather than expert psychological testimony. However, the content of the
judge's commentary is quite similar to the content of the testimony provided
by expert psychologists. In this experiment, subjects watched a forty-minute
videotaped trial involving an eyewitnessed incident. There were three
conditions of judicial commentary: a control condition in which the judge
delivered standard instructions regarding issues of reasonable doubt; a
condition in which the judge delivered standard instructions and a summary
of the witnessing conditions (instruction + summary); and a condition in
which the judge delivered standard instructions, the summary, and a comment
on the psychological findings regarding eyewitness identification (instruction
+ summary + comment). Results indicated that the instruction + summary
+ commentary condition yielded significantly fewer predeliberation guilty
verdicts and shorter deliberation times than did the control condition, with the
instruction + summary condition falling in between with respect to both
measures.
98. Maass, Brigham & West, Testifying on Eyewitness Reliability: Expert Advice Is Not Always
Persuasive, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1985).
99. Id. at 213.
100. Id. at 216.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 216, 223.
103. Id. at 219.
104. Katzev & Wishart, The Impact of Judicial Conimentar, Concerning Eveuitness Identifications on Jury
Decision Making, 76j. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGN 733 (1985).
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Fox and Walters' 0 5 exposed undergraduates to videotaped segments of
eyewitness testimony and expert psychological testimony. The witness
expressed either high or low confidence. Three conditions of expert
testimony were crossed with the eyewitness conditions: no expert testimony,
general expert testimony, and specific expert testimony. General expert
testimony consisted of testimony similar to that used by Wells, Lindsay, and
Tousignant, 0 6 including identification accuracy rates obtained in previous
experiments, general memory processes (acquisition, retention, and
retrieval), and types of memory (sensory, short-term, and long-term). Specific
testimony, on the other hand, did not address general memory processes.
Instead, the expert psychologist discussed the effects of twelve specific factors
known to influence eyewitness memory (for example, physical factors,
exposure time, retention interval, stress, weapon focus, and the fairness of
lineup procedures). In all expert testimony conditions, the expert
psychologist discussed the weak relationship between confidence and
accuracy. Results showed that jurors who heard expert testimony were
significantly less likely to believe the witness than were jurors who did not
hear expert testimony. A main effect was also found for witness confidence.
There was no trend toward improved sensitivity to the weak confidence-
accuracy relationship associated with expert testimony. Specific testimony led
to less belief in the eyewitness identification than did general testimony.
E. Summary and Conclusions
The research described above reveals several consistent findings about
expert testimony. Most evident is the finding that reduced belief and fewer
convictions are obtained if expert testimony is presented. 10 7 However, it is
not clear whether this reduced belief is due to skepticism (which it may appear
to be on first examination) or to improved sensitivity to factors that might
have impaired the witness' ability to make a correct identification. Fox and
Walters; 10 8 Hosch, Beck, and McIntyre;' 0 9 Maass, Brigham, and West; I 10 and
Katzev and Wishart' I1 did not independently vary the presence of expert
testimony and witnessing and identification factors that have important
influences on eyewitness memory. Therefore, skepticism and sensitivity are
perfectly confounded; and it is impossible to determine whether changes in
conviction rates occur as a result of greater juror sensitivity or as a result of
simple skepticism. Fox and Walters' 12 did vary the presence of expert
105. Fox & Walters, The Impact of General Versus Specific Expert Testimony and Eyewitness Confidence
Upon Mock juror Judgment, 10 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 215 (1986).
106. Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, supra note 91.
107. Fox & Walters, supra note 105; Hosch, Beck & McIntyre, supra note 97; Katzev & Wishart,
supra note 104; Loftus, supra note 93, at 13; Maass, Brigham & West, supra note 98; Wells, Lindsay &
Tousignant, supra note 91.
108. Fox & Walters, supra note 105.
109. Hosch, Beck & McIntyre, supra note 97.
110. Maass, Brigham & West, supra note 98.
111. Katzev & Wishart, supra note 104.
112. Fox & Walters, supra note 105.
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testimony and eyewitness confidence simultaneously, but there was no
substantial improvement in juror sensitivity to the weak relationship between
confidence and identification accuracy.
The only experiments that simultaneously and independently varied both
witnessing factors that influence identification accuracy and the presence of
expert testimony were those by Loftus" 3 and by Wells, Lindsay, and
Tousignant. 1 4 Both show trends (albeit weak) toward improved sensitivity.
Unfortunately, both studies are weak in realism and external validity.
Analyses ofjury deliberations yield inconsistent effects. Hosch, Beck, and
McIntyre;" 15 Loftus;' 16 and Maass, Brigham, and West' ' 7 all found that expert
testimony increased the time that jurors spent deliberating about eyewitness
evidence, while Katzev and Wishart 18 found that less overall deliberation
time was associated with expert testimony. But what can be made of
deliberation time? Perhaps more time spent deliberating means that the
jurors are attempting to reach an understanding of how a given factor might
have influenced the witness' memory. If so, expert testimony, which
presumably clarifies these issues, should lead to less deliberation time. On
the other hand, perhaps extended deliberation time means that jurors are
giving more thoughtful attention to the eyewitness evidence. Without more
detailed content analyses, it is difficult to characterize the effect of expert
testimony on jury deliberations.
One difficulty with this body of research is that the choice of dependent
measures is not systematic. First, none of the experiments attempted to
determine whether jurors remembered the eyewitness testimony and the
expert testimony. Second, in experiments in which sensitivity and skepticism
effects were not confounded," 9 expert testimony had weak effects on juror
sensitivity. Expert testimony may have improved juror knowledge about
memory processes and the factors that influence memory, but the effect might
have been attenuated due to poor integration skills. These experiments did
not attempt to assess knowledge and integration separately.
In sum, the research supports Wells' conclusion: "At this point . . . we
must acknowledge fully that there has not been a persuasive demonstration in
the published literature that expert testimony on eyewitness matters improves
the judgments ofjurors."120
113. Loftus, supra note 93.
114. Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, supra note 91.
115. See supra note 97.
116. See supra note 93.
117. See supra note 98.
118. See supra note 104.
119. Fox & Walters, supra note 105; Loftus, supra note 93; Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, supra
note 91.
120. Wells, supra note 15, at 86.
Page 43: Autumn 19891
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
VII
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
In light of existing research, the concerns over the effects of expert
testimony are valid but speculative. As experimental psychologists, we are
able not only to offer expert testimony, but we are also in a position to
evaluate empirically the influence of our expert testimony on juror
decisionmaking. The next in our series of studies explores in detail the
influence of expert testimony on the cognitive process of jurors.
A. Overview
The study by Cutler, Penrod, and Dexter 12 1 improved on earlier
experiments in a variety of ways. First, witnessing and identification
conditions, witness confidence, and the presence of expert testimony were
varied systematically, which allowed for tests of juror sensitivity and juror
skepticism. Second, the study reflects Wells' recognition that it is important
to examine the influence of expert testimony on variables in addition to the
jury's final verdict: "There are other effects . . .such as the effect of expert
testimony on the process by which jurors reach a verdict ... 122 To determine
the stage(s) at which expert testimony affects juror sensitivity, Cutler, Penrod,
and Dexter explored juror memory, knowledge, inference, and
decisionmaking.
This study used 538 undergraduate subjects who saw the same trial
materials used in the earlier studies. However, expert psychological
testimony was introduced as well. The expert testimony proceeded as
follows. First, the witness' expertise was established, and the judge explained
to the jury that the expert had been qualified at a previous hearing. Next, the
expert described to the jury the case-relevant documents that he had studied
before the trial. Finally, in full accord with Rule 702, the expert testified
about the reconstructive nature of memory and the factors that affect memory
at the perception, encoding, storage, and retrieval stages. In response to the
defense attorney's questions, the expert discussed how the crime and the
identification procedure might have influenced the witness' memory of the
perpetrator. In all trials, the expert discussed the effects of stress and
violence, the presence of a weapon, the passage of time, suggestive lineup
procedures, and the relationship between confidence and identification
accuracy. The expert discussed the effects of disguises only in trials in which
the witness testified that the robber was disguised during the robbery.
Immediately following the defense's examination of the expert, the
prosecution mounted a rigorous cross-examination and developed the
following points:
(1) in all previous cases in which the expert testified, he testified
solely for the defense;
121. Cutler, Penrod & Dexter, The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist, and the jury, supra note 59.
122. Wells, supra note 15, at 89.
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(2) the research about which the expert testified relied heavily on
the use of college undergraduates as subjects and primarily used
crime simulations rather than actual crimes;
(3) some psychologists express doubts about the reliability of the
research findings and about the extent to which the research findings
generalize to actual crime situations;
(4) stress and violence can sometimes improve memory;
(5) individuals can vary in their reactions to stress and violence;
(6) there is no way of knowing just how much stress a witness
experienced at the time of a crime; there is no way of knowing how
stress affected a given witness' memory;
(7) some studies show a direct relationship between eyewitness
confidence and identification accuracy;
(8) even in studies in which a low correlation between confidence
and accuracy is found, some witnesses make correct identifications
and are highly confident;
(9) in simulated eyewitness experiments there are usually no actual
consequences associated with false identifications or correct
identifications; and
(10) the expert is being paid approximately sixty dollars per hour
for his testimony.
B. Design
Four factors, each having two levels, were manipulated in the Cutler,
Penrod, and Dexter experiment: witnessing and identification conditions,
witness confidence, form of testimony, and whether or not the expert gave an
opinion about the likelihood that the witness' identification was correct.
Control groups, consisting of two levels of witnessing and identification
conditions and two levels of witness confidence, added another four cells. In
all, twenty separate videotaped trials were constructed.
1. Witnessing and Identification Conditions. In view of the established findings
that jurors are insensitive to the factors that influence eyewitness
identification accuracy, several factors were combined to form a powerful
manipulation of witnessing and identification conditions ("WIC"). In the
"poor WIC," the witness and police officer offered the testimony associated
with the disguise, weapon present, fourteen-day retention interval, and
suggestive lineup instructions. In the "good WIC," the witness and police
offered testimony associated with the no-disguise, weapon hidden, two-day
retention interval, and neutral lineup instruction conditions.
2. Witness Confidence. As in the earlier studies, the witness' confidence in the
accuracy of her identification was varied. In half the trials, the witness
testified that she was 80 percent confident, while in the other half she testified
that she was 100 percent confident.
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3. Form of Testimony. In addition to testimony describing memory processes
and factors that influence memory ("descriptive testimony"), in half the trials
the expert discussed the findings of eyewitness experiments more
quantitatively. In these trials, the expert described the effects of the relevant
factors using verbal labels (that is, small, medium, or large) as well as
percentages of correct and false identifications obtained in eyewitness
identification experiments ("quantitative testimony"). Thus, jurors exposed
to expert testimony either heard descriptive testimony or descriptive and
quantitative testimony. The expert testimony experiment of Fox and
Walters 123 similarly varied whether the testimony was general or specific.
Specific testimony was more effective than general testimony. Rather than
examining whether quantitative testimony is more effective than descriptive
testimony, the current experiment examines whether quantitative testimony
improves upon descriptive testimony alone. The rationale for this variation is
that the descriptive testimony would probably be given in most cases, while
quantitative testimony would probably not be given unless it preceded the
offer of more general testimony.
4. Expert Opinion. In half the trials, the defense attorney asked the expert
for an opinion regarding the likelihood that the witness' identification of the
defendant was correct. The expert gave the opinion on a scale ranging from 0
(least likely to be correct) to 25 (most likely to be correct). In the poor WIC
trials the expert offered a rating of 7; in the good WIC trials the expert offered
a rating of 20. Witness confidence was not considered in the opinion because
of its weak relationship with identification accuracy.
The manipulation of expert testimony, WIC, and witness confidence
permitted separate tests of sensitization effects and skepticism effects. A
skepticism effect would appear as a simple effect for expert testimony, such
that jurors would be less likely to believe the identification if there is expert
testimony than if there is not. A sensitization effect would emerge as a more
complex interaction between WIC and expert testimony or between witness
confidence and expert testimony. This interaction would show that
witnessing and identification conditions have a stronger influence on jurors'
judgments if there is expert testimony than if there is not. Witness
confidence, on the other hand, would more strongly influence jurors'
judgments if there is no expert testimony than if there is.
C. Dependent Measures
Memory for the witnessing conditions and for the expert testimony (for
those who viewed expert testimony) was also assessed. Jurors were asked to
recall the four stages of memory. In addition, knowledge about the effects of
witnessing factors was assessed. For factors that were manipulated and held
constant, jurors rated the extent to which the factor was likely to contribute to
123. Fox & Walters, supra note 105.
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a correct identification in both the specific and the general cases. To obtain
measures of thejurors' inferences drawn from the eyewitness evidence, subjects
rated the credibility of the eyewitness and the strength of both the
prosecution's and the defense's cases. Decisions about verdict and probability
ratings (the probability that the defendant was guilty, the probability that the
witness correctly identified the robber, and the probability that under the
circumstances the average person could make a correct identification) were
also assessed.
Assessments of juror memory, knowledge, inference, and decisionmaking
were designed to ascertain the point in the inferential chain where jurors go
awry in evaluating eyewitness evidence. Is it that jurors do not remember the
evidence, do not think the evidence is important, or fail to integrate the
information effectively in their inferences or judgments? The answer to this
question might vary as a function of the factors being examined. It is clear
from the previous experiments that jurors, for the most part, recall the
evidence and that the expert evidence does not influence their judgments.
Jurors may believe that some factors are simply unimportant. They may view
other factors as important, although without giving them sufficient weight to
be reflected in the jurors' judgments.
D. Results
1. Juror Memory. Consistent with the earlier studies, jurors demonstrated
superior memory for the evidence surrounding both the crime and the
identification. This finding indicates that memory cannot be blamed for any
lack of effects for WIC on jurors' judgments. In light of the high recall rates,
it is also probably the case that expert testimony does little to improve
memory. There is little room for improvement.
Overall memory for the expert testimony was also very good, although
over half the subjects incorrectly reported that the expert discussed mugshot
searches and the effects of the size of the lineup. This finding suggests an
appreciable response bias toward reporting that the expert discussed a given
factor, although accuracy rates were much higher for factors the expert
actually discussed.
2. Analytic Strategy. WIC, witness confidence, and the various forms of
expert testimony were examined for their influences on juror knowledge,
inference, and decisions. One set of analyses explored how expert testimony
influenced juror knowledge, inference, and decisionmaking, as compared to a
control group. For this comparison, all expert conditions were combined. A
second set of analyses explored the differential influences of form of expert
testimony and expert opinion on juror knowledge, inference, and judgment.
The descriptive testimony (with no expert opinion) was chosen as the
condition against which all comparisons were made. One rationale for
choosing the descriptive testimony condition is that it is the form most
commonly employed in the courtroom.
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In discussing the results of this study we again make extensive use of d, the
standardized measure of effect sizes. 124 A d of zero would indicate that two
means are identical, while a d of .3 (or -. 3) would indicate a difference in
means that, in the context of this study, is worthy of note.
3. Juror Knowledge. Juror knowledge refers to the juror's view of how an
eyewitness factor influences identification accuracy. Consider, for instance,
the ratings for the role of disguise. Ifjurors in the poor WIC (high disguise)
rated the impact of disguise in the current case to be 5.0 on a 9 point scale
(anchored at one end by "produces false identifications" and at the other end
by "produces correct identifications"), and jurors in the good WIC (low
disguise) also rated the impact of disguise to be 5.0, this finding would
indicate that jurors failed to recognize any influence of disguise on
identification accuracy. Expert testimony would improve juror knowledge if
the expert testimony either increases the influence of WIC on ratings of the
effects of disguise, weapon visibility, retention interval, or lineup fairness, or
attenuates the influence of witness confidence on confidence ratings.
WIC had a large effect on ratings of the role of disguise (d = 2.30),
indicating that jurors were well aware that disguises affect identification
accuracy. It is therefore not surprising that expert testimony did not improve
juror knowledge for the effects of disguise (that is, all interaction terms were
statistically nonsignificant).
WIC had a trivial and nonsignificant effect on weapon visibility ratings (d =
.13), indicating that jurors were unaware of the effects of weapon focus on
identification accuracy. WIC had a larger effect on weapon visibility ratings
among jurors who heard expert testimony (d = .41) than among jurors who
heard no expert testimony (d = -. 03). This finding indicates that expert
testimony improved juror knowledge about the effects of weapon focus.
Descriptive testimony improved juror knowledge about the effects of weapon
visibility on identification accuracy, but its sensitizing effect was attenuated by
the addition of either quantitative testimony or an expert opinion.
WIC had a large effect on the knowledge ratings for retention interval
(d = . 78), indicating that subjects were aware that recognition accuracy
declines over time. No other effects were significant. WIC also produced a
large effect on ratings of the importance of lineup instructions (d = 1.70),
indicating that jurors considered lineup instructions to be important in
assessing identification accuracy. Even though jurors were aware of the
effects of lineup instructions, the addition of an expert opinion to descriptive
testimony improved juror knowledge in comparison to the descriptive
testimony alone (d = 2.22 and 1.39, respectively).
Witness confidence had an appreciable effect on knowledge ratings for
witness confidence (d = .72), indicating that jurors believed that confidence is
a good predictor of identification accuracy. Confidence was viewed as less
124. For a discussion of d, see supra Part III.B.
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relevant among jurors who heard expert testimony (d = .52) than among
jurors who heard no expert testimony (d = .84). Descriptive testimony
sensitized jurors to the weak confidence-accuracy relation in comparison to
those who heard no expert testimony (d = .17 and .84, respectively).
These analyses show that jurors believed that disguise, retention interval,
and lineup instructions all have appreciable effects on identification accuracy,
but jurors were unaware of the effects associated with weapon visibility. As in
previous experiments, jurors felt that witness confidence was an important
determinant of identification accuracy. The presence of expert testimony in
any form improved juror knowledge of the effects of weapon visibility, lineup
fairness, and witness confidence. The addition of an expert opinion to
descriptive testimony, in comparison to descriptive testimony alone,
improved juror knowledge for lineup fairness but had a negative impact on
juror knowledge for the weapon focus effect. The descriptive testimony
appeared to be superior to the descriptive-plus-quantitative testimony in
improving juror knowledge of the weapon focus effect and the weak predictive
validity of witness confidence. Of course, knowledge of these factors is no
guarantee that the knowledge will be successfully employed when making
inferences and judgments.
4. Juror Inferences. Inferences refer to the jurors' perceptions of the
credibility of the eyewitness and the strengths of the prosecution's and
defense's cases. Ratings of credibility varied directly with the witness'
confidence level (d = .37), but confidence was given less weight in
determining witness credibility if the expert testified (d = .11) than if no
expert testified (d = .52). WIC also affected eyewitness credibility ratings to a
greater extent if an expert testified (d = .34) than if no expert testified
(d = -. 01), indicating that expert testimony improved juror sensitivity to
WIC effects. In fact, the descriptive testimony led to a slight reversal effect
for witness confidence.
The jury perceived the prosecution's case as stronger in the good WIC
(d = .30), but WIC had more of an effect on the perceived strength of the
prosecution's case if an expert testified (d = .54) than if no expert testified
(d = .15). The prosecution's case was perceived as stronger if the witness was
100 percent confident (d = .20). The confidence of the witness was a more
powerful determinant of the strength of the prosecution's case if the expert
gave descriptive-plus-quantitative-plus-opinion testimony (d = .64) than if the
expert gave only descriptive testimony (d = -. 16).
The defense's case was perceived as stronger in the poor WIC (d = -. 30).
WIC had a stronger influence on defense case strength ratings if the expert
testified (d = -. 53) than if no expert testified (d = -. 13).
In sum, although jurors indicated that they believed that several of the
factors included in the WIC manipulation would influence eyewitness
performance, WIC had negligible effects on juror inferences without expert
testimony. When the expert testified, however, jurors demonstrated
Page 43: Autumn 1989]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
significant sensitivity to WIC when drawing inferences about the credibility of
the eyewitness and when determining the strength of the prosecution's and
defense's cases. The form of expert testimony and the offering of an expert
opinion did not consistently influence juror sensitivity to WIG. The presence
of expert testimony in some form also reduced jurors' heavy reliance on
witness confidence when drawing inferences about the credibility of the
eyewitness and the strength of the prosecution's case. The presence of expert
testimony in some form also increased the apparent strength of the defense's
case, but did not increase juror skepticism about the eyewitness' credibility.
5. Juror Decisionmaking. WIC had an appreciable effect on jurors'judgments
about the accuracy of the identification (d = .30). Jurors were more likely to
judge the identification as accurate in the good WIC than in the poor WIC.
However, WIC had a large influence on jurors' judgments if the expert
testified (d = .53), but a negligible effect if no expert testified (d = .12).
Jurors were also more likely to judge the identification as accurate if the
witness was 100 percent confident than if the witness was 80 percent confident
(d = .25). Whenjurors heard descriptive testimony, probability ratings varied
inversely with the confidence of the witness (d = -. 45). This was not true
with the other forms of testimony. The descriptive testimony also improved
juror sensitivity to WIC to a greater extent (d = .94) than did the descriptive-
plus-quantitative testimony, which showed a small sensitization effect
(d = .08). Expert testimony and form of expert testimony produced trivial
main effects on probability ratings. Thus, there was no evidence of a
skepticism effect.
WIC had a main effect on verdict such that more convictions were obtained
with good WIC (d = .29). The descriptive testimony led to an inverse relation
between witness confidence and proportion of guilty verdicts (d = -. 29),
though other forms of testimony did not. Once again, WIC had a stronger
influence on verdicts if the expert gave descriptive testimony (d = .94) than if
no expert testified (d = .20). This finding indicates that descriptive expert
testimony sensitized jurors to the influence of WIC on identification accuracy.
The descriptive testimony had a greater sensitization effect (d = .94) than did
the descriptive-plus-quantitative testimony (d = .08) and the descriptive-plus-
quantitative-plus-opinion testimony (d = .24). Expert testimony and form of
expert testimony produced trivial main effects on verdicts, again indicating no
skepticism effect.
6. Summary of Results. Expert testimony clearly improved juror sensitivity to
WIC in comparison to the control condition, and descriptive testimony was
the most effective form of testimony in this respect. The effects of expert
testimony on the relation between witness confidence and jurors' decisions,
however, are less clear-cut. If no expert testimony was given, witness
confidence produced an appreciable effect on jurors' judgments. And
although descriptive testimony improved juror sensitivity to WIC, it produced
an inverse relation between witness confidence and probability ratings and
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between witness confidence and verdict. In contrast, the descriptive-plus-
opinion and descriptive-plus-quantitative-plus-opinion conditions produced
positive relationships. It is noteworthy that there were essentially no
skepticism effects: Neither the presence of expert testimony nor the type of
expert testimony had any appreciable effect on credibility ratings for the
eyewitness, probability ratings, or verdict.
E. The Problem of Knowledge Versus Integration
It is clear from the above analyses that jurors do indeed possess some
knowledge of the effects of disguise, retention interval, and suggestive lineup
instructions. However, jurors are unaware of the influence of weapon
visibility and are unaware that confidence is a weak predictor of identification
accuracy. Thus, poor knowledge is partly responsible for the lack of juror
sensitivity. Evidence that jurors lack integration skills emerges from the
findings that the influence of WIC and confidence diminish between the
knowledge and inference stages. Ifjurors were able to integrate the evidence
appropriately, then the effect-sizes for WIC and witness confidence in the no-
expert conditions would remain relatively constant in magnitude across juror
knowledge, inference, and judgment items. The clear attenuation of effect-
sizes from the knowledge to the inference stages, for both WIC and witness
confidence, indicate difficulties in integrating evidence. Moreover, WIC,
without expert testimony, had a trivial influence on inferences and decisions
(all d's were no greater than .20). Thus, both lack of appropriate knowledge
and poor integration skills jointly contribute to produce poor juror sensitivity
to eyewitness evidence.
This experiment indicates that expert testimony improved juror
knowledge. Expert testimony increased the juror's reliance on witnessing and
identification conditions when drawing inferences about the credibility of the
eyewitness and the strength of the prosecution's and defense's cases, and
decreased juror reliance on witness confidence when drawing inferences
about the credibility of the eyewitness and the strength of the prosecution's
case. At the decisionmaking stage, expert testimony facilitated greater
reliance on witnessing and identification conditions in determining the
probability that the identification was correct and in shaping the verdict.
There was no evidence to suggest that expert testimony promotes skepticism
toward the eyewitness' credibility, the accuracy of the identification, or the
defendant's culpability (all d's were less than .10).
There were few consistent effects of various types of expert testimony on
juror knowledge. On balance, the descriptive testimony looked most
effective. All expert testimony conditions were equally effective at sensitizing
witnesses to the effects of witnessing and identification conditions at the
inference stage. At the decisionmaking stage, the descriptive and the
descriptive-plus-opinion conditions were most consistent in sensitizing jurors
to the effects of witnessing and identification conditions.
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F. Conclusions and Implications
This study provides considerable evidence bearing on the controversies
surrounding expert psychological testimony. Scholars have debated whether
psychological knowledge about factors that influence memory is within the
ken of the jury. The research described here indicates that jurors have some
but not all of the necessary knowledge. A more deeply rooted problem,
however, is that because of difficulties associated with integrating evidence,
even knowledge within the ken of the jury is not reflected in the jurors'
judgments.
Do the effects of expert testimony on jurors' judgments confirm the
expectations of psychologists and legal scholars? Does expert testimony
produce confusion, sensitivity, or skepticism? There was some evidence of
juror confusion-the inexplicable reversal effects produced at the
decisionmaking stage. Perhaps the most compelling evidence against juror
confusion is the striking impact of expert testimony. There were only two
dependent measures (of ten) on which expert testimony had no effects-
knowledge for disguise and retention interval effects. These results are
understandable given that jurors had pre-existing knowledge of these effects.
The memory tests revealed that jurors recalled virtually all of the relevant
evidence and the expert testimony, but our memory test for expert testimony
might not have been sufficiently sensitive to detect juror confusion.
With respect to sensitization and skepticism, there was considerable
evidence for the former and no evidence for the latter. Scholars view
improved sensitization as a desirable consequence of expert testimony.1
2 5
While the desirability of a skepticism effect remains in debate, the results of
this study suggest that it should not be a matter of concern. With respect to
previous research that has confounded the sensitization and skepticism
effects, 12 6 the current results suggest that effects were due to sensitization.
While the results of this experiment indicate that expert testimony can
have salutary effects, several important empirical questions remain open. One
critical issue involves cases in which both prosecution and defense hire
experts. The prosecution expert could, for example, stress the limitations of
the research and the difficulties with generalizing from the restricted samples
and experimental situations characteristic of eyewitness studies. If expert
testimony on eyewitness identification were admitted regularly, would the
court become a forum for a battle among experts, as McCloskey and Egeth
suggest? 127 Furthermore, in a battle of the experts, will the jury discount one
expert's testimony on the basis of an opposing expert's testimony? Will the
jury be confused by the contradictory testimony of the experts?
The influence of expert testimony on the jury deliberation process should
be examined as well. Maass, Brigham, and West treated pre- versus post-
125. Wells, supra note 51.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 107-11.
127. McCloskey & Egeth, supra note 13, at 559.
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deliberation judgments as an independent variable and found that effects for
expert testimony were exaggerated following deliberation.128  This finding
implies that the sensitization effects observed here might underestimate the
effect that would emerge after deliberation. Further research is also needed
to explore the effectiveness of other forms of expert testimony as well as other
safeguards, such as carefully constructed judicial instructions, for protecting
against false convictions based on mistaken identifications.
VIII
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF EXPERT ADVICE FOR JURIES
Additional studies by Cutler, Dexter, and Penrod12 9 sought to address
some of the questions outlined above. The studies examine the influence of a
court-appointed expert and opposing experts and of judical instructions
concerning eyewitness memory. The Telfaire instruction is a commonly used
instruction for directing the jury's attention toward presumably relevant
eyewitness factors.130 The only previous test of the Telfaire instruction found
that it had minimal effects on the decisions of jurors.13 1
A. Research Design
These studies used two levels of WIC, good versus poor, which were
crossed with two levels of witness confidence, 80 percent versus 100 percent
confidence that the identification was correct. The trial was the same one
used in the preceding research, and the WIC and witness confidence
manipulations were essentially the same. Two hundred ninety
undergraduates served as subjects in the study. The WIC and confidence
factors were crossed with six forms of expert advice:
The no expert advice condition served as a control against which the effects of other
forms of expert advice could be compared.
The defense-hired expert condition was identical to that used in the previous study and
included the same rigorous cross-examination.
The testimony of the court-appointed expert was identical to that of the defense-hired
expert; however, the court-appointed expert was introduced and questioned by the
judge. The court-appointed expert condition was created by replacing the defense
and prosecuting attorneys' questions with the judge's examination and cross-
examination questions; thus, the expert's testimony was identical across expert
testimony conditions.
Telfaire instructions focused the jury's attention on thirteen witnessing and
identification factors, including the witness's confidence, the circumstances under
128. Maass, Brigham & West, supra note 98, at 215.
129. Cutler, Dexter & Penrod, Expert Testimony andJury Decisionmaking: An Empirical Analysis, 7
BEHAV. Sci. & LAw 215 (1989); Cutler, Penrod & Dexter, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification: The Hired Gun, the Friend of the Court, the Battling Experts, and the Judge, supra
note 59.
130. See, e.g., Moore v. Tate, 882 F.2d 1107 (6th Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Bear, 883 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir.
1989); U.S. v. McNeal, 865 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir. 1989).
131. Greene, Eyewitness Testimony and the Use of Cautionary Instructions, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 15
(1987) (Symposium on Eyewitness Identification Testimony).
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which the identification was made, and the length of time between the crime and the
identification. 132
The prosecution-hired opposing expert established his credentials (which were
comparable to the defense-hired expert's) and testified to the following points:(1) eyewitness research techniques are not always reliable; (2) many psychologists
believe that, because of limitations in research methods, the results of many
eyewitness studies do not generalize to actual crime settings; (3) studies of violence,
weapon focus, and witness confidence produce mixed results; (4) there is no way to
know how much stress was experienced by a witness; (5) there is no way to assess the
fairness of an actual lineup; and (6) there is no way to know whether a specific witness
is accurate or inaccurate. During cross-examination, the opposing expert admitted
that: (1) criticisms of the eyewitness studies are directed toward the applicability of
the research to criminal settings and not toward the quality of the research; (2) the
quality of eyewitness research meets scientific standards; and (3) his views represent a
minority of experimental psychologists, while the defense-hired expert's views
represent the majority.
Defense-hired expert plus judge's instructions. The defense-hired expert testified and the
Telfaire instructions were given.
B. Results
1. Evidence and Confidence Effects. WIC had no significant effects on verdicts
or on evaluations of eyewitness credibility or of the accuracy of the eyewitness
identification. In contrast, witness confidence had a significant effect on all of
these judgments (for example, 39 percent of jurors convicted in the 80
percent confidence condition versus a 49 percent conviction rate in the 100
percent confidence condition).
2. Skepticism Effects. In comparison to the no advice control group,
significant and consistent skepticism effects were obtained for the opposing
experts and court-appointed expert conditions. The witness credibility rating
in the no expert condition was 6.2 versus 5.6 in the court-appointed condition
and 5.2 in the opposing experts condition. Comparing verdicts, 42 percent
convicted in the opposing experts cordition, 30 percent in the court-
appointed expert condition, and 57 percent in the no expert condition.
Skepticism effects for the remaining conditions were small, inconsistent, and
statistically nonsignificant.
3. Sensitization. The opposing experts condition produced the strongest
and only statistically significant sensitization effect. Subjects in the opposing
experts condition relied most on witnessing and identification conditions and
least on witness confidence when evaluating witness credibility and rendering
verdicts. The remaining expert advice conditions also reduced juror reliance
on witness confidence when compared with the no advice condition, but these
differences were not statistically significant.
4. Replications. The effects of the defense-hired expert in the current study
were comparable to those of the preceding study. In both instances the
defense-hired expert produced trivial and nonsignificant skepticism effects.
132. Cutler, Penrod & Dexter, The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist, and thejury, supra note 59.
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Although in the current study the defense-hired expert produced
nonsignificant sensitization effects, in three of the four sensitization tests
(sensitization to witness confidence and to WIC with each of two dependent
measures), the sensitization effects were actually larger in the current
experiment than in the preceding experiment. The earlier study included
data from 538 subjects while the current study had a more modest sample size
of 290, and thus the statistical tests were less sensitive in the latter. We
conclude that the results of the earlier study are replicated.
C. Discussion
In summary, the defense-hired expert produced no skepticism, and, as in
Cutler, Penrod, and Dexter,' 33 produced some sensitization to WIC and
witness confidence. In contrast, the court-appointed expert failed to sensitize
jurors to relevant witnessing and identification conditions, and promoted
substantial skepticism about the accuracy of the identification. The opposing
experts produced both skepticism about the identification and sensitization to
WIC. Ironically, the sensitization effects produced by the opposing experts
were stronger in magnitude than the sensitization effects produced by the
defense-hired expert alone.
Because the content of the defense-hired and court-appointed expert
testimony was identical (it was the same videotaped footage), the differences
in skepticism and sensitization must be attributable to some aspect of the
defense-hired expert's adversarial status. Perhaps because the defense-hired
expert was treated like any other defense witness (that is, the expert was
examined by the defense attorney and cross-examined by the prosecuting
attorney), subjects evaluated his testimony together with the testimony of
other witnesses. This hypothesis might account for the interaction effects
between expert testimony, witnessing and identification conditions, and
witness confidence (that is, sensitization effects) observed in the Cutler,
Penrod, and Dexter study and in the current experiment. In contrast, perhaps
because the court-appointed expert was treated differently from other
witnesses, having been questioned only by the judge, subjects considered his
testimony independent of the other witness' testimony.
The stronger skepticism and sensitization effect for the opposing experts
in comparison to the defense-hired expert is counterintuitive. The
prosecution-hired expert made an admirable attempt to discredit the defense-
hired expert's testimony, but this attempt substantially backfired. Perhaps
subjects reasoned that the eyewitness evidence must really be important if
both sides had exerted the effort to hire expert psychologists, and this
reasoning led jurors to scrutinize more carefully the eyewitness evidence and
the expert testimony.
The set of Telfaire instruction findings raises significant doubts about its
efficacy. First, the Telfaire instructions produced no skepticism or sensitization
133. Id.
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effects, either alone or in combination with defense-hired expert testimony.
Indeed, there was a consistent trend toward reduced sensitization to
witnessing and identification conditions associated with the Telfaire
conditions. The fact that the Telfaire instructions, alone and in combination
with expert testimony, reduced subjects' reliance on witness confidence
should be considered in light of the instruction's content, which encourages
subjects to rely more heavily on witness confidence. These null effects are
noteworthy given that the Telfaire instruction is commonly used in eyewitness
cases. Thus, we conclude, as does Greene, 3 4 that the Telfaire instructions
ineffectively protect the defendant against mistaken conviction. Greene's
revised instruction appears to be more effective and indeed deserves further
investigation.
The findings have some additional implications concerning the strategies
of both defense and prosecuting attorneys. The defense attorney can, in
some circumstances, harm the case by hiring an expert to testify about
eyewitness identification. As demonstrated above, presentation of expert
testimony together with good witnessing and identification conditions can
lead to an increased likelihood of conviction. The defense-hired expert is
apparently successful at reducing the likelihood of conviction if the witnessing
and identification conditions appear likely to facilitate a false identification or
if the witness is highly confident. From the prosecution's standpoint, hiring
an expert to oppose the defense-hired expert, as demonstrated in the current
experiment, can be detrimental to the state's case. On the other hand, a
prosecution expert who testifies about the strengths of an eyewitness
identification may well increase conviction rates. To date, there has been no
empirical test of whether a prosecution-hired expert can be effective for the
state's case. More research is needed to identify the circumstances that
moderate the effectiveness of the defense- and prosecution-hired experts in




In cases where the reliability of an eyewitness identification is in question,
expert psychologists are being called with increasing regularity to educate
jurors about memory processes and factors that can influence eyewitness
identification accuracy. There is considerable debate within both the legal
and psychological communities about the admission of such testimony.
Proponents and opponents of expert testimony disagree over (1) whether
there is an adequate scientific foundation for the presentation of such
testimony, (2) whether the evidence provided by the expert is beyond the ken
of the jury, and (3) whether expert testimony is likely to improve jury
134. Greene, supra note 131.
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decisionmaking. We have reported a series of studies designed to examine
these three issues empirically.
The first study was a quantitative "meta-analysis" of a large body of
experiments conducted by researchers interested in facial recognition
performance. This study indicated that factors investigated by researchers
have substantial and reliable effects on eyewitness performance and that
experimental laboratory findings do not differ significantly from findings
produced in field settings.
In a second set of studies, mock jurors were shown realistic videotaped
criminal trials in which the primary evidence was the identification of the
defendant by an eyewitness. The evidence surrounding the crime (for
example, the disguise of the perpetrator and the extent to which the witness
was threatened) and the identification procedures (for example, the time
delay between the crime and the identification, as well as the procedures used
to construct and conduct the lineup parade) were manipulated through the
testimony of the eyewitness and the police officer in charge of the
investigation. These studies examined the extent to which juror decisions
were influenced by the variations in the crime and the identification. The
studies indicate that jurors were not influenced by the factors that normally
influence identification accuracy-with the exception that judgments were
influenced by the confidence of the eyewitness. Unfortunately, a number of
studies indicate that witness confidence is only weakly related to the accuracy
of the identifications.
In the third set of studies, the videotaped trials included expert
psychological testimony. In the first study of this set, expert testimony
improved the sensitivity ofjurors to eyewitness evidence. If expert testimony
was presented, jurors took the witnessing and identification factors into
consideration to a greater extent, and the confidence of the witness to a lesser
extent, than if no expert testimony was presented. The study also showed
that expert psychological testimony did not increase juror skepticism about
eyewitness evidence. The second experiment examined the influence of
different forms of expert testimony and judicial instructions on jurors'
judgments. A defense-hired expert produced some sensitization toward
witnessing and identification conditions but no skepticism toward the
accuracy of the identification. A court-appointed expert produced only
skepticism. Opposing experts (defense- and prosecution-hired) produced the
largest effects on both sensitization and skepticism, while judicial instructions
designed to aid the jury in evaluating eyewitness evidence had no beneficial
effect on jury decisionmaking.
Overall, these studies indicate that expert psychological testimony can
improve jury decisionmaking by assisting jurors in the task of appropriately
evaluating eyewitness evidence, and that the improvements in juror sensitivity
can be secured without increasing juror skepticism.
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